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Abstract 
The implementation of the Internet of Things will result in the connection of tens of billions of 
wireless devices to the Internet. These devices will form an intelligent substrate pervading all 
aspects of life. From intelligent home control to advanced city management systems, devices 
will sense their environment as well as interconnect and communicate with each other to form 
intelligent smart spaces. Individually and collectively, these devices produce and consume 
large amounts of personally sensitive data. This new environment provides a rich set of data 
sources; when used in conjunction with one another, they can greatly inform a historical 
situation that may have occurred with little or no reliable human witness evidence. However, 
this deeply pervasive environment will provide challenges to the various agencies that will 
need to interact with this new technology. This paper establishes the fundamental overarching 
challenges the IoT poses to digital forensics, and identifies the key areas that solutions should 
target. 
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1. Introduction: The Internet of Things 
The Internet of Things (IoT), in the context of this paper, describes a world where 
many otherwise ordinary devices are uniquely identifiable, addressable and 
contactable via the Internet. Such things may be little more than a sensor or actuator 
augmented with basic transceiver electronics to manage connectivity requirements. 
Alternatively, these things may be sophisticated and comparable to typical consumer 
electronics devices, providing local computational functionality – such as a set-top 
Digital Video Recorder, or the headline-grabbing intelligent fridges commandeered 
in the infamous “Spam Fridge” attacks (Chirgwin, 2014).  
As such, some things may have a degree of server functionality and respond readily 
to incoming requests and queries, whereas less sophisticated devices may simply 
generate and transmit their output data on certain triggers. They may take their power 
from a mains, self-generating or sustainable supply, or may be tightly constrained 
low-power battery operated devices with a limited power lifespan.  
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Additionally, their connectivity state – and therefore participation in the IoT – may 
be temporary or sporadic; based on the availability or status of power supply, the 
presence of a compatible thing-to-Internet gateway, or only triggered by thing-
specific stimuli. The devices may therefore spend much of their time in a very low 
power state; idle or disconnected. 
However, regardless of their appearance and power source, their placement – and 
looking to the future, their ubiquity – will allow them to collect and potentially store 
and process tremendous amounts of data. This data may not in itself be directly or 
deliberately personally identifying. Its combination and correlation with other 
datasets, both virtual and real, can provide significant insight into personal activity 
and environmental conditions. 
This paper identifies the challenges IoT poses to established digital forensic 
procedures, and the areas in which solutions should be targeted. Section 2 provides 
an overview of the general digital forensics literature to illustrate where the 
challenges posed by the IoT interact with existing digital forensics models. In 
addition to this, recent works on the challenges posed by the IoT to digital forensics 
are reviewed to establish the state of the art research in this area. Section 3 describes 
the challenges posed by the IoT and some approaches to overcoming them. Section 4 
identifies the key issues and emerging requirements of IoT investigations. Section 5 
describes the future research directions and work required to develop solutions to the 
challenges posed to IoT investigations. 
2. Related Work 
2.1. Digital Forensics 
Law enforcement agencies, private organisations and even individuals are familiar 
with the combination of digital and physical evidence resulting from forensic 
investigations. As electronic devices become pervasive this trend looks set to 
continue. For example it is commonplace for the police to check with mobile 
network operators, whether drivers were using a mobile telephone, when 
investigating road traffic incidents (GM Casualty Reduction Partnership, 2014) 
(Haines, 2007). Internet of Things devices augment today’s digital data environment 
with potentially significant personal and context-setting data feeds. We identify the 
requirements for investigations in the IoT by first considering the seminal work of 
McKemmish (McKemmish, 1999) that describes Digital Forensics as: 
“The process of identifying, preserving, analysing and presenting digital evidence in 
a manner that is legally acceptable” 
The application of this definition to investigation in the IoT raises a number of 
challenges. To develop an understanding of these challenges and their place in the 
digital forensic process we consider the two predominant models for digital forensic 
investigations. Table  provides an overview of the models proposed by McKemmish 
(McKemmish, 1999) and NIST (Kent, Chevalier, Grance, Dang, & Kent, 2006). 
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Stage McKemmish Kent 
1 Identification, in this stage the location and 
format of evidence is identified to enable an 
appropriate mechanism to be determined for 
the purpose of recovering evidence. Digital 
evidence can be found in a myriad of places; 
computers, mobile phones, smart cards, set top 
boxes etc. 
Collection, encompasses 
identification, 
preservation and 
acquisition of relevant 
evidence 
2 Preservation, it is imperative that evidence is 
preserved as in many cases it will be the 
subject of judicial scrutiny. In some 
circumstances changes to data are unavoidable. 
In these cases change should be minimised and 
the process causing the change documented 
along with an explanation/justification of why 
the change was required. 
Examination, uses 
automated and manual 
tools to extract data of 
interest. 
3 Analysis, consists of the extraction, processing 
and interpretation of digital evidence. It forms 
the main element of forensic computing. 
Following extraction, processing is often 
required to make data human readable. 
Processing of extracted data may be part of the 
extraction stage or a separate stage in its own 
right. 
Analysis, the derivation 
of useful information 
from the results of the 
examination stage. 
 
4 Presentation, the final stage of the process 
involves a presentation of both the evidence 
and the process by which the evidence was 
gathered along with the presenter’s 
qualifications. 
Reporting, is concerned 
with the preparation and 
presentation of the 
evidence and forensic 
analysis process. 
Table 1: Digital Forensics Process Models 
In the following section, we survey the literature relating to IoT forensics. We then 
revisit the investigatory stages detailed in Table , to consider the challenges specific 
to each stage of the investigatory process. 
2.2. IoT Forensics 
The identification and preservation of evidence in digital forensic investigations in 
emerging environments has always presented a challenge. Taylor et al (Taylor, 
Haggerty, Gresty, & Hegarty, 2010) suggested that the standards by which evidence 
is judged in digital forensic investigations may have to be altered to accommodate 
the changing nature of digital evidence from a cloud computing environment. We 
believe the same proposition holds true for IoT investigations.  
Oriwoh et al (Oriwoh, Jazani, Epiphaniou, & Sant, 2013) identified preservation as a 
challenge, and suggested that devices undergoing investigation should not be turned 
off to preserve the modified, created and accessed times of files. Their assertion is 
likely drawn from conventional digital forensic investigations; however, the situation 
is much more complex in IoT investigations. Thought must be given to the limited 
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resources available on devices, leaving the devices running at the scene of an 
incident will use power, and more importantly may result in overwriting of stored 
data due to constrained storage capabilities. Therefore, consideration is required to 
determine whether devices should be powered off or left running. We study this 
challenge in further detail in section 3. 
The extraction and preservation of data from devices and services running in the IoT 
will present challenges. Proprietary data formats, protocols, and physical interfaces 
all complicate the process of evidence extraction (Miorandi, Sicari, De Pellegrini, & 
Chlamtac, 2012). Some schemes distribute information to adjacent nodes within the 
same topology or to external cloud services. In these scenarios, investigators need to 
be able to identify the benefit to the investigation in extracting data from other nodes, 
base stations, or cloud services (Attwood, Merabti, & Abuelmaatti, 2011). This 
approach could be viable and may overcome some of the challenges associated with 
extracting data from devices with limited storage. The data stored and processed in 
the IoT can be of a sensitive nature. We posit that the way in which large 
corporations aggregate and process data, may be the subject of future digital forensic 
investigations.  
Oriwoh et al (Oriwoh et al., 2013) identify the challenge posed by devices crossing 
the boundaries of jurisdictions; while we agree this is a challenge. It is highly likely 
that data in transit between IoT devices and globally distributed cloud computing 
platforms cross these boundaries on a far more frequent basis. In Section 3 we 
question whether the emphasis of investigations should be on devices or data, and 
whether devices may be viewed as a metadata aspect of the data or if the reverse is 
true. 
3. IoT Forensic Challenges & Approaches 
The IoT will undoubtedly provide a richer source of evidence from the physical 
world than conventional computer systems. The way in which IoT is realising Zelkha 
et al’s vision of ambient intelligence (Zelkha, Epstein, Birrell, & Dodswoth, 1998) 
means that environments are beginning to react to the user’s requirements, without 
the need for conscious interaction by the user. As a result, IoT environments are 
likely to contain contextual evidence of which the perpetrators are simply oblivious. 
This paradigm shift means that digital investigations will increasingly encounter 
evidence from events taking place in the physical world. 
The four main phases of digital forensics investigation from Table 1 face a number 
of challenges from the IoT. We discuss the implications of the IoT for each phase 
under the headings below and identify areas in which solutions should be targeted 
3.1. Identification 
Detecting the presence of IoT systems poses challenges to digital forensic 
investigations, as does the identification of a particular user’s data. This raises the 
question of how to carry out what law enforcement term “search & seizure” when it 
is not apparent where the data being investigated is being stored, or where the data 
came from.  
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A potential solution to identification of data may be the integration of IoT device 
data into Building Information Modelling (“National BIM Standards,” 2013); 
Building Information Modelling (BIM) is a digital representation of physical and 
functional characteristics of a facility. A BIM is a shared knowledge resource for 
information about a facility forming a reliable basis for decisions during its life-
cycle; defined as existing from earliest conception to demolition. 
By combining the information about the IoT capabilities of a building or structure, it 
may be possible to answer the questions of; where has the information come from? 
Where is the information stored? It is also crucial to identify in what format the data 
is stored or encoded. This would narrow the scope of the investigation, and enable 
the selection of features or data that identifies an individual user from a much smaller 
data set. A composite picture of the data gathered about an individual user could be 
constructed from the data stored or forwarded by the buildings they have inhabited. 
3.2. Preservation 
There are established procedures in place to capture volatile evidence before it 
becomes unavailable, for example first responders  can create memory dumps prior 
to a machine being shut down (Thomas, Sherly, & Dija, 2013). Evidence volatility in 
the IoT is much more complex; data may be stored locally by a thing, in which case 
the lifespan of the data before it is overwritten or compressed using a lossy technique 
is finite. The data from a thing may be transferred and consumed by another thing or 
a local ad-hoc network of things, alternatively it may transferred to the cloud for 
aggregation and processing. 
The transfer and aggregation of data/evidence presents a challenge when securing the 
chain of evidence. In order to overcome this challenge and leverage the resilient 
nature of data in IoT in digital investigations, techniques are required to track and 
filter the transit of data across an IoT environment. Such techniques will facilitate the 
identification and extraction of data assumed to have been modified or deleted due to 
the constraints of IoT devices. 
Preservation of the scene is a contentious issue in digital forensics. IoT investigations 
will complicate matters further due to the nature of the devices undergoing analysis. 
It is possible that data at a crime scene will be overwritten/compressed if the devices 
cannot interact with a cloud service provider to store their data, and they collect more 
data than they can store. This presents a problem for first responders, who must 
decide whether to preserve the evidence on the devices by allowing data transfer 
from the scene and then face the challenges of an inter-jurisdiction evidence 
collection process. Alternatively, they may sever the connection between the devices 
and the cloud and attempt local extraction of evidence from devices that may be of a 
proprietary nature. However, the physical placement, power availability or 
connectivity of each device may render this approach impractical. This also raises 
the question of whether – and how – a first responder or investigator should prevent 
devices recording information once a scene has been secured. Principle two of the 
ACPO guide indicates that a person may access the original data during in an 
investigation if they are capable of explaining the relevance and implications of 
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doing so (7safe, 2011). Further research is required to determine what the 
implications are under a variety of circumstances. Ideally, a mechanism should be in 
place to enable an investigator to serve a “digital warrant” that prevents evidence 
being compromised.  
We consider the interplay between the legal and technical challenges associated with 
gathering evidence from an IoT environment. A warrant is served during 
conventional investigations as the first part of the evidence preservation process. The 
warrant details the scope of evidence to be seized and examined. In the case of the 
IoT service providers, they often store data on behalf of their users. This means that 
individuals may not have direct access to their own data, or it may be presented to 
them in a different format than that in which it is stored. This complicates the 
preservation process, as the warrant may have to be served to individuals and their 
service providers. 
3.3. Analysis 
Analysis of data from an IoT environment will have to consider the provenance of 
evidence in order to demonstrate the evidence is reliable and authentic. Data 
provenance in the IoT differs from conventional digital forensic investigations in 
which the temporal dimension is often the main consideration e.g. file modified, 
accessed, and created time, email time lines (Inglot, Liu, & Antonopoulos, 2012). 
The interaction between IoT and cloud computing facilitates the aggregation and 
processing of data from the IoT. The vast quantities of data generated by IoT and 
stored in large-scale distributed cloud environments (Osborne & Slay, 2011) is likely 
to be the subject of a cloud investigation. From a technical perspective the image, 
analyse present paradigm of current digital forensics practice (Allen, Whittaker, & 
Howard, 2005), (Grobler, Louwrens, & von Solms, 2010) does not map well onto the 
IoT domain. This is aside from the ethical issues of imaging these devices in multi-
tenancy cloud environments (Naqvi, Dallons, & Ponsard, 2010), (Burd, Jones, & 
Seazzu, 2011). There are a number of technical barriers; IoT data is either stored on 
proprietary devices that are difficult to interface with or in cloud computing 
platforms where the scale, distribution and remote nature of the data preclude 
imaging as a viable extraction process. Distributed analysis techniques are required 
to analyse the data stored in cloud computing platforms. Some work has already been 
carried out in this area to tackle the challenges posed by cloud computing 
investigations (Hegarty, Merabti, Shi, & Askwith, 2012), (Garfinkel, 2007). 
3.4. Presentation 
Presenting the findings of IoT investigations poses a new challenge; data will often 
have undergone aggregation and processing using analytic functions that can alter 
the structure and meaning of data. At the device level, lossy compression techniques 
may reduce the granularity of the data order in to preserve limited resources such as 
memory, battery life, network bandwidth, etc. The granularity and semantics of 
evidence from the IoT will create challenges to digital forensic investigations. For 
example, one system may store temperature ranging from 0-5 as cold, 6-10 as 
average, 11-16 as warm and 16+ as hot. Another system may use different figures 
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and describe the same temperature readings using different terminology resulting in a 
semantic gap. Ontological descriptors and standardisation of metadata has limited 
adoption, with a view to moving IoT devices towards a semantic sensor web (Sheth, 
Henson, & Sahoo, 2008). However, from a forensics perspective, the issue is that 
devices may adopt differing descriptor formats or may retain a proprietary format. 
Presentation poses a challenge regardless of the underlying format of the data, as the 
conflicting grammar describing data from IoT systems has the potential to be 
misleading. 
4. Key Issues and Emerging Requirements 
The emergence of the IoT will present new opportunities for data to be misused and 
lead to an expansion and development of new digital forensic techniques. We 
identify new approaches that may emerge out of the necessity to analyse the IoT. 
4.1. Preservation Issues 
Firstly we consider the preservation of evidence, forensic readiness is an area that is 
relatively well understood in conventional computing environments (Pangalos, 
Ilioudis, & Pagkalos, 2010). We agree with (Trček, Abie, Skomedal, & Starc, 2010) 
who state that an alternative approach is required to enable IoT forensic 
environments to achieve the same. As we suggested in Section 3 a digital warrant 
would assist in the gathering of evidence. This approach could be extended to 
“digital preservation orders” that prevent evidence from be contaminated or 
overwritten by reducing the resolution at which data is captured by devices, or 
freezing the data stored by service providers. The warrant would be digitally signed 
by the serving authority to enable the providers or devices to check the authenticity 
of the warrant. The providers or devices would them submit the requested 
information to the authority over a standard set of interfaces. 
4.2. Aggregation Issues 
The financial motivation behind many IoT systems is the value that comes from the 
data aggregated in the providers’ systems. Such data sets are valuable marketing 
commodities. Future investigations may benefit from such data to provide or 
substantiate evidence about an individual or sequence of events.  
However, to consider briefly an opposing standpoint; aggregated data may breach 
data privacy legislation, with the holders of data inferring information about 
individuals that breaches legislation. New techniques are required to reason over data 
and determine what can be inferred from large data sets, likewise techniques are 
required to investigate cases where “aggregation offences” are alleged to have taken 
place. Similarly, investigatory techniques are required to analyse cases where 
anonymisation techniques were inadequate, or rendered so by joint analysis of many 
data sets. Legal frameworks must be updated alongside the development of these 
techniques to ensure that the data gathered by the IoT is not misused. 
While the aggregation of data provides the possibility of inferring useful information 
about an individual, it also introduces some challenges such as the semantic gap 
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discussed in Section 3. One approach to tackling this challenge is the development of 
digital forensic tools that can bridge the semantic gap. These tools would enable 
calculation and comparison of the granularity of data from different sources. This 
approach would be particularly useful when conflicting evidence emerges from 
different IoT devices or service providers. It may be possible to resolve semantic 
conflicts and even use characteristics of the measurements taken by different systems 
to provide evidence that is more accurate. 
5. Conclusion and Further Work 
The IoT presents a large-scale source of potential evidence. However due to the 
heterogeneous nature of the IoT devices, the ways in which data is distributed, 
aggregated, and processed presents challenges to digital forensics investigations. 
New techniques are required to overcome these challenges and leverage the 
architectures and processes employed in IoT to in order to gain access to this rich 
source of potential evidence.  
In order to realise the approaches proposed in this paper, a test bed is required for 
implementation, deployment, analysis and evaluation. The Contiki open source OS 
for the IoT (“Contiki OS,” 2013) will be used to a test bed. To enable the deployment 
of techniques on a variety of different devices and network topologies. Experiments 
will be conducted to evaluate the resource overhead of issuing the digital warranty 
and preservation orders proposed in this paper. To analyse the trade-off between 
resource utilisation and evidence gathering, and compare the impact of a variety of 
certification techniques, that could employed to authenticate the 
warrants/preservation orders. The test bed will also enable experiments on evidence 
extraction and the development of standard interfaces for evidence extraction from 
current and future IoT systems 
The development of guidance for investigators on how to carry out investigations in 
the IoT will be a major output from the development of the test bed. Experimental 
investigations will enable the identification of considerations that investigators must 
take into account when investigating the IoT. Along with the development of metrics 
to determine whether it is better to shutdown devices or leave them running in situ.  
Our analysis of IoT forensics has prompted us to consider how we view and deal 
with data and devices in the broader digital forensics field. Is data a by-product of 
human-device or device-device interaction, or should the devices be considered as 
attributes of the data? What are the implications of these two viewpoints for the 
wider field? 
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